Early in the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukrainian forces exhausted NATO’s annual peacetime production of 155-millimeter artillery shells within weeks (AVV Action 2023). This shortfall revealed a failure of strategic assumptions about modern war rather than battlefield strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, Western militaries have planned for short, precision-driven, and technologically decisive conflicts. Precision-guided munitions, networked command systems, cyber operations, and space intelligence promised swift, economically contained, and limited wars. The 1991 Gulf War seemed to validate this model, and two decades of counterterrorism operations reinforced the belief that mass mobilization, large stockpiles of weapons, and sustained industrial output belonged to a bygone era (Betz and Smith 2025).
That assumption is now under strain. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, alongside rising Indo-Pacific tensions, point to a dual-industrial reality where technological sophistication and industrial endurance are inseparable. Precision weapons, drones, AI-enabled targeting, and sensor networks remain essential, but their battlefield effectiveness depends on the capacity to produce munitions at scales, repair equipment, and replace losses. Strategic advantage lies in resilience and the ability to endure disruption without losing coherence or credibility. This article argues that contemporary conflict requires a greater focus on regenerative power—the capacity of states and alliances to restore military effectiveness after sustaining losses—and that this capacity is becoming a critical foundation of deterrence.
This development challenges the linear “generations of warfare” narrative, which portrays military history as a progression from line and column tactics to industrial warfare, then to Cold War maneuver warfare, and finally to networked post-industrial conflict (Ameen 2024). The wars in Ukraine and Gaza cast doubt on this teleology. Rather than superseding earlier forms, contemporary wars combine mass, attrition, and industrial production with advanced digital technologies. Therefore, describing warfare as “post-industrial” risks complacency in procurement, logistics, and deterrence planning.
It also calls into question key assumptions of post-Cold War strategic thought. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) literature suggested that information dominance and precision strikes would diminish the importance of mass and attrition (Tubbs 2002), while fourth-generation warfare theorists predicted a diffusion of power from industrial states to decentralized non-state networks (Lind, et al. 1989). Although these perspectives captured important technological developments, they underestimated the enduring significance of industrial capacity. Modern military technologies depend on complex production ecosystems, critical minerals, and resilient supply chains. The result is not the displacement of industrial warfare but its transformation.
Throughput Is Still Necessary
Throughput—the capacity to produce, repair, and replace materiel under sustained pressure—remains a necessary condition for success in high-intensity conflict. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine’s high expenditure rates have exposed the limits of NATO’s peacetime industrial base. The rapid depletion of Western stockpiles forced NATO governments and industries to expand manufacturing capacity, invest in dormant plants, and increase labor (Pettyjohn and Dennis 2023). These steps resembled Cold War-era industrial contingency planning far more than post-2001 counterinsurgency models.
At peak periods, Ukrainian forces fired up to 7,000 Western-supplied artillery shells per day, far exceeding NATO planning assumptions (United States Studies Centre 2022). Air-defense shortages proved equally revealing. High unit costs and limited production capacity constrained advanced air-defense interceptors, while lower-cost Russian loitering munitions generated sustained operational pressure (Miller and Foy 2026).Meanwhile, repair cycles strained logistics. Ukrainian field workshops improvised repairs and cannibalized damaged systems to keep platforms operational, while modern Western platforms faced maintenance delays due to limited spare parts, specialized tooling, and long supply chains (Khrystoforov 2025).
Historical precedent confirms that endurance and industrial capacity matter as much as tactics. During World War II, U.S. industry produced nearly 300,000 military aircraft (PBS 2026), while the Soviet Union built over 100,000 tanks to maintain offensive operations (Connor 1987, 14). During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact defense planning emphasized collective defense, reserves, and mobilization to underwrite stability through sustained deterrence (NATO 1991).
The contemporary implication is that grand strategy in the twenty-first century depends less on deploying forces than on organizing the industrial ecosystems that sustain them. Semiconductor subsidies, critical-mineral investments, workforce development, and supply-chain diversification determine military readiness, alliance resilience, and deterrence credibility. Ukraine has become the first industrial stress test of the century, exposing the strategic costs of taking industrial resilience for granted. War has therefore not become post-industrial but dual-industrial (Raufoglu 2026).
Precision Deepens Dependence
High-technology weapons amplify industrial demands rather than reducing them. Precision-guided munitions, drones, and autonomous systems depend on microelectronics, optical components, and rare-earth elements concentrated in a few production hubs (Hudson and Beaver 2024). Advanced radars require gallium; autonomous platforms need neodymium or dysprosium (King 2025). A semiconductor shortage can halt missile production (Gould 2022), and a disrupted magnet supply can ground unmanned fleets (King 2025). In modern industrial war mass and precision operate as a tightly coupled system. Sophistication increases effectiveness but deepens vulnerability to supply-chain disruptions.
Ukraine revealed three structural weaknesses across NATO: limited stockpiles, industrial inertia following decades of consolidation, and a shrinking skilled workforce (Aries, et al. 2023). Conversely, despite sanctions, Russia adapted by dispersing production across civilian sectors and prioritizing wartime manufacturing (Kolyandr 2025). The lesson is clear: technological superiority alone does not ensure operational resilience or strategic stability.
This dynamic requires a fundamental reassessment of structural realist metrics of “latent power.” Although offensive realism theory promoted by John Mearsheimer tends to value a state’s latent military potential by aggregate wealth and population, assuming that these resources easily convert into kinetic capability (Mearsheimer 2001, 47), the modern dual-industrial reality operates in a highly specialized global economy where GDP is not inherently fungible. Modern supply chains and extreme component specialization mean that raw economic size or industrial output cannot be easily converted into high-tech military production without control of critical chokepoints. A financialized economy with a multi-trillion-dollar GDP cannot rapidly translate wealth into artillery shells or microelectronics if it lacks domestic machine-tool infrastructure, chemical processing plants, and a specialized manufacturing workforce.
Assessments of power typically focus on existing inventories or force structures (Bowers and Stålhane Hiim 2026). Recent conflicts suggest the need for an additional category: regenerative power, or the ability of a state to restore military capability after sustaining losses. It encompasses industrial capacity, skilled labor, logistical resilience, and institutional adaptability (Singh Mann 2026). In prolonged competition, regenerative power determines whether military effectiveness can be sustained over time. These dependencies alter the temporal logic of war. High-intensity conflict is shaped by how quickly systems can be replaced once combat begins.
Yet regenerative power is not solely a national characteristic. In alliance systems, it can be collective. A state’s ability to replace losses increasingly depends on access to allied industrial capacity, shared logistics networks, interoperable production standards, and trusted supply chains. The war in Ukraine illustrates this dynamic. Ukraine’s military endurance has relied on the combined productive capacity of NATO states (Bowen 2026), demonstrating that military regeneration can be distributed across an alliance rather than concentrated within a single state. This suggests that alliance cohesion should be measured by the capacity of allies to collectively sustain production, maintenance, and replenishment during prolonged conflict, and not merely by troop contribution or defense spending. In an era of dual-industrial warfare, alliances therefore function both as security communities and as regenerative ecosystems. This collective dimension may be understood as alliance regenerative power: the capacity of an alliance (as opposed to a single state) to replace losses, restore military effectiveness, and sustain operations through integrated industrial, logistical, and technological networks.
Industrial Time and the New Escalation Ladder
Modern war suffers from a mismatch between the speed of destruction and the pace of replacement. Precision weapons and AI targeting compress the timeline of combat to minutes and seconds. Industrial regeneration, however, unfolds on a slower clock of months and years, constrained by mining, refining, skilled labor, and capital investment (Spencer and Viola 2025). This temporal asymmetry has become a decisive strategic variable. States may retain technological superiority yet lose operational momentum simply because they cannot replace losses fast enough. The result is a temporal contradiction: the speed of destruction accelerates while the speed of regeneration remains stubbornly slow. Strategic success depends on the ability to endure accelerated consumption.
Ukraine illustrates this dynamic. Artillery barrels wear out faster than factories can manufacture them; air-defense interceptors are expended more quickly than production lines can replenish them (Sucio 2025). This compression of strategic choice forces commanders to adapt tactics to what can be sustained rather than what is doctrinally optimal (Hamilton 2025). Attrition reemerges in a technologically accelerated form. This mismatch has created a new domain: industrial escalation. Contemporary conflicts are shaped by deliberate efforts to constrain an adversary’s capacity to produce, repair, and replace military systems (Cancian, et al. 2021). Export controls, sanctions, infrastructure attacks, and the strategic exploitation of supply chains determine the duration and intensity of war. These measures decisively shape outcomes without crossing conventional red lines.
This manifestation of industrial escalation aligns with Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman’s theory of weaponized interdependence (Farrell and Newman 2019). The global production network for advanced military hardware is structured around highly centralized, asymmetric hubs and chokepoints. When states exploit these networks by restricting rare-earth elements or denying semiconductor manufacturing equipment, they leverage structural power embedded within global capitalism. In dual-industrial conflict, the traditional escalatory ladder must expand to include this structural domain. Strategic dominance belongs to the state that commands central production nodes and can endure the asymmetric severing of supply chains.
Additionally, industrial escalation reshapes deterrence. Adversaries now assess whether the United States and its allies can sustain a protracted contest once inventories deplete and production lines face stress. The ability to surge output, substitute suppliers, and repair systems under pressure has become a vital form of latent power. Consequently, classical deterrence theory, which focuses on denying objectives or imposing costs (Mazarr 2018), requires revision to include a third dimension: regenerative capacity. The credibility of deterrence depends not only on what a state possesses today but also on what it can rebuild tomorrow. Industrial resilience functions as latent deterrent power. States capable of rapidly replacing losses reduce the likelihood that an opponent will perceive a favorable window of opportunity.
For alliances, deterrence credibility increasingly depends on what might be termed regenerative credibility: an adversary’s belief that coalition members can collectively replenish losses faster than they can be imposed. During the Cold War, alliance cohesion was often measured through political commitments and forward-deployed forces. In contemporary conflict, an equally important measure may be the degree of industrial integration among allies. Co-production agreements, shared supply chains, common technical standards, and coordinated procurement strategies transform separate national industrial bases into a collective deterrent asset. An alliance capable of regenerating combat power collectively presents a more formidable deterrent than the sum of its individual arsenals, because it reduces opportunities for coercion through attrition and signals the capacity for sustained resistance.
Emphasizing regenerative capacity and regenerative credibility also highlights the limits of technological solutions. Artificial intelligence and cyber operations accelerate the consumption of materiel but cannot compress the physical timelines of manufacturing. Software cannot substitute for steel, explosives, fuel, and skilled labor. The belief that technological speed can compensate for industrial capability risks repeating a familiar historical error of mistaking efficiency for resilience and innovation for endurance.
Industrial Constraints Are Global
These dynamics extend far beyond Europe. Any high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific or Middle East would confront similar constraints under harsher conditions. The Gaza conflict illustrated this on a smaller but revealing scale, as Israel’s demand for interceptors and precision munitions strained U.S. inventories already stretched by Ukraine (Harris and Robertson 2024). Israel entered the campaign with an elite and technologically sophisticated military. Yet, even under conditions of overwhelming superiority, sustainment emerged as a strategic concern. Prolonged demands for Iron Dome interceptors and precision munitions generated renewed dependence on U.S. industrial replenishment (Franzman 2025). Technological asymmetry shapes tactical outcomes, but it does not eliminate the need for continuous industrial regeneration. Consequently, the distinction between local war and systemic industrial consequences has blurred.
For Washington, the question is whether it can sustain commitments across multiple theaters without inviting opportunistic pressure elsewhere. Outcomes are increasingly shaped through supply chains and production ecosystems. Semiconductors, AI components, precision munitions, and drones rely on specialized facilities concentrated in a handful of locations (Thadani and Allen 2023). Disruption at a single node—such as chip fabrication, energetic chemical processing, or magnet production—can ripple across entire force structures.
Rare-earth elements exemplify this vulnerability. China dominates the processing value chain for these critical components, granting it economic leverage in peacetime and strategic leverage in a crisis (Pandey 2025). Control over critical minerals, alongside semiconductor fabrication and shipyards, constitutes the modern bedrock of latent military power. Beijing’s civil-military fusion strategy enables the rapid conversion of civilian capacity to military output (Levesque 2021). By contrast, Western economies spent decades optimizing for efficiency rather than resilience, treating redundancy as waste and stockpiles as dead capital (Reinsch 2021). Ukraine has revealed the risks embedded in that choice.
The Indo-Pacific sharpens these challenges. Cyber operations, drones, and long-range strikes cannot resolve Taiwan’s central wartime problem of sustainment. A conflict would hinge on contested maritime and aerial access, environments where cyber effects and drones cannot deliver fuel, ammunition, spare parts, or replacement platforms at scale (Sicheri 2024). China’s industrial position compounds this challenge. Its dominance in shipbuilding, semiconductors, and critical materials allows rapid mobilization under stress. Conversely, U.S. production capacity remains limited in key areas, with some munition inventories likely to be expended in weeks (S & P Global 2026). That asymmetry carries profound implications for the classical offense-defense balance in the Indo-Pacific. While precision weapons and algorithmic targeting superficially appear to favor a swift fait accompli annexation of Taiwan, dual-industrial logic suggests the opposite at the systemic level. Because precision systems accelerate inventory consumption, they shift the long-term strategic advantage back to the defense—provided that the defender or its patrons possess superior industrial depth.
Robert Jervis’ foundational theory of stability hinges on whether defensive postures are distinguishable from, and more robust than, offensive ones (Glaser and Kaufmann 1998). In cross-strait deterrence, visible investments in industrial regeneration, supply-chain redundancy, and localized repair capabilities act as a powerful defensive signal, demonstrating to a revisionist power that a rapid low-cost offensive victory is structurally impossible (CSIS 2024). This is not an argument for permanently militarized economies but for strategic insurance. Just as financial stress testing aims to prevent crises, industrial resilience reduces incentives for aggression by narrowing windows of opportunity.
Critics raise three familiar objections: that emphasizing industrial preparedness risks reviving Cold War militarization (Goodman 2024); that large-scale investment is economically inefficient (Lincicome 2021); and that nuclear deterrence renders conventional endurance irrelevant (Mueller 2020). Each misreads contemporary conflict. Resilience requires the ability to absorb shocks and sustain allies, not mass conscription. Resilience and efficiency are not opposites. Investments in semiconductors, shipbuilding, skilled labor, and advanced manufacturing underpin civilian prosperity as much as military power. Furthermore, while nuclear weapons constrain strategic escalation, they do not prevent prolonged conflict below the nuclear threshold, as Ukraine vividly demonstrates. Software cannot replace interceptors, and algorithms cannot repair damaged vehicles. Technology reshapes attrition, but it does not eliminate it.
If industrial capacity shapes military outcomes, Western states face three imperatives: capacity, resilience, and time. For the United States, this means treating industrial policy as a component of deterrence. Long-term contracts can preserve surge capacity without permanent mobilization, workforce development can rebuild critical skills, and diversified supply chains can reduce exposure to coercion. Alliances must adapt as well. NATO and Indo-Pacific partners might be wise to coordinate standards, expand co-production, and reduce fragmentation to prevent strategic surprise. Such measures do more than improve efficiency; they strengthen alliance regenerative power by enabling partners to collectively sustain military effectiveness during prolonged crises. Initiatives like AUKUS, the trilateral security partnership between Australia, U.K., and U.S. (U.S. Department of State 2026), point in the right direction, but their scale must match the challenge.
Conclusion
Modern wars are not clean or limited. AI, drones, precision missiles, and massed forces interact in hybrid systems where mass and precision both matter, but endurance matters most. War has not become post-industrial; it has become dual-industrial. More fundamentally, industrial resilience should be understood not merely as a military variable but as a form of structural power. International relations scholars have traditionally analyzed power through military capabilities, economic resources, or institutional influence. Contemporary conflict points to a new strategic baseline: the ability to organize and regenerate complex production networks under conditions of geopolitical stress. States that control critical nodes within these global manufacturing systems possess advantages that extend far beyond traditional military and economic power. They can absorb disruption, shape the strategic choices of allies and adversaries, and prolong coercive or defensive campaigns. Strategic competition is therefore increasingly a contest between rival industrial ecosystems, where alliance networks determine which states can regenerate military power fastest and longest. Consequently, the central strategic question of the twenty-first century may not be which state possesses the most advanced military technology. The lesson emerging from Ukraine, Gaza, and the Indo-Pacific is that states that mistake precision for permanence risk discovering that battlefield superiority can erode faster than it can be rebuilt. The future of deterrence may depend less on the weapons an alliance possesses today than on its collective ability to regenerate combat power tomorrow.
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Further Reading on E-International Relations